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ABSTRACT  
 
Because assumptions that firm decisions to manage external politics revolve around traditional 
resources and capabilities (e.g., capital, technology) impede environmental management 
theories, this research explores additional antecedents, i.e., perceived uncertainty, firm political 
infrastructure. Study One qualitative data support ideas related to management as a matter of a 
firm’s perceptually constructed environment among deterministic firms. Study Two quantitative 
data find a strategic choice firm orientation is developed through management structures (e.g., 
specialized staff, routines), despite post-hoc analyses confirming both firm types operate in 
similar environments. Combined, these studies disconfirm traditional resources as a driver of 
firm political activity. Moreover, Study Two confirms a sequence so that firm political action is 
driven (hindered) by infrastructure (uncertainty), not vice versa. These results also imply that 
public policy drafters can segment the market by firm political infrastructure to efficiently 
account for various levels of firm political response to such policy.    
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of firms managing forces external to their organization has seen several 
evolutionary arguments over the past 50 years. However, the general belief is that firms should 
alter their environment for greater control of operational conditions, i.e., strategic choice. Yet, 
determinism still runs rampant in today’s society. Determinism is an orientation which views the 
environment as determining firm structure, and strategic choice an orientation which positions 
the firm as having choice in altering the environment so that it does not have to structurally adapt 
(e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). While beverage manufacturers 
Pepsi Company and Coca-Cola Company employed local push-polls in an effort to defeat the 
Berkeley, California soda tax bill (Reich 2014), a proactive strategic choice strategy designed to 
alter regulation pressures, Dr. Pepper introduced the relatively less sugary Dr. Pepper 10 product 
in employing a reactive, determined strategy.  
 
This research asks, Why are some firms determined by the external environment while others 
choose to alter it? Prior research is divided over the answer to this question. Some scholars 
suggest that choosing to alter the external environment is a matter of maintaining the right 
resources and capabilities (e.g., Burns and Stalker 1961; Duncan 1972; Hambrick, MacMillan, 
and Day 1982; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Schendel and Patton 1978), and others a matter of 
managerial choice (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984). This research 
attempts to parse these discrepancies using primary data from the firm in question regarding 
firm-government relationships. Prior empirical attempts either judge a firm’s management 
approach through secondary data (Bocquet, Le Bas, Mothe, and Poussing 2013; Lawless and 
  
Finch 1989), asks customers to describe their supplying firm’s management approach (Sharma 
and Vredenburg 1998), or only examine the manager’s personality traits and demographics (Hitt 
and Tyler 1991). Study One (a) utilizes qualitative data to understand how firms perceive 
uncertainty in their environment and Study Two (b) taps quantitative data to test such uncertainty 
as driving determinism. The a) transcendental phenomenonology and b) path model 
methodological lenses appropriately work to understand a) the phenomenon of strategic choice 
and deterministic firms experiencing the same environment differently and b) firm infrastructure 
impeding interpretations of environmental uncertainty among strategic choice firms, 
respectively. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
The present research – across two studies – offers findings important to those government 
officials charged with drafting government public policy. Firm management of the politics 
underlying government policy does not necessarily require traditional resources, but instead can 
result from a person’s time, privileged information, access, etc. (Alt and Chrystal 1983). Thus, 
studying political threats of the external environment offers a study context that allows for the 
direct examination of firm resources and capabilities driving firm management. Indeed, the 
findings disconfirm prior notions regarding traditional resources, such as firm size and wealth, 
driving political activity. Instead, proactive firms simply develop internal infrastructure for 
managing governments (e.g., government affairs Washington, D.C. offices, specialized 
government forecasting roles). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Contributions to Environmental Management Literature  
 
To our knowledge, prior research has yet to report such starkly differential drivers of strategic 
choice and deterministic firm management orientations. Findings across both studies suggest that 
a strategic choice firm orientation develops through intentional and tangible management 
structures (e.g., specialized staff, mechanisms, technical expertise). Yet, a deterministic firm 
orientation appears to be the result of experiencing the external environment as uncertain. 
Because firms with a strategic choice orientation operate in this same external environment, yet 
are not oriented as such because of perceptions of uncertainty, firms with a deterministic 
orientation appear to have enacted their environment. The “enacted” environment ensues from 
management that depends on firm experiences of events of the external environment (i.e., 
determinism; Silverman 1970). Because the post-hoc analyses indicate that both types of firms 
indeed operate in similar environments – deterministic firms are not found to be threatened more 
or have fewer traditional resources and capabilities (e.g., capital, technology) than strategic 
choice firms – the uncertainty deterministic firms report as a contingency to strategic political 
action appears to be enacted.  
 
Contributions to Public Policy Literature 
 
Additionally, the present research contributes to marketing and public policy literature by 
examining firm political infrastructure as a segmenting characteristic, as well as an antecedent to 
a wide variety of firm political strategy. The present findings suggest those drafting public policy 
  
can assess the degree of firm political resistance to a policy given the degree of firm political 
infrastructure among those likely to be impacted by the policy. For example, after first 
segmenting the market accordingly, policy makers could adjust the policy tool so it can target 
portions of the market represented by relatively fewer firms maintaining political infrastructure. 
In turn, such targeted firms are relatively less likely to launch a strategic resistance to the given 
policy, which most likely aims to keep consumers safe and healthy. Prior firm political 
infrastructure research is either descriptive (Baysinger and Woodman 1982) or conceptual in 
nature (Shaffer 1995), or examines internal conflict experienced by associated departments and 
personnel (Shaffer and Hillman 2000). And prior corporate political activity literature with the 
potential to aid in such segmentation efforts is either policy- (Kolk and Levy 2001; Martin 1995) 
or activity-specific (Bhuyan 2000; Drope and Hansen 2006; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011), or 
also conceptual (Auld, Cashore, Balboa, Bozzi, and Renckens 2010; Hutt, Mowka, and Shapiro 
1986; Stern 1969). Unlike this prior research, the present research identifies political 
infrastructure as a segmentation tool for which policy makers can utilize in predicting firm policy 
resistance regardless of the type of strategic resistance or policy topic. The present research finds 
infrastructure to drive activity ranging from lobbying to constituency building to political ties 
across policy topics ranging from public transportation to food tariffs to health care. Prior 
empirical corporate political activity and infrastructure research either identifies firm size and 
wealth or no market segmentation characteristics (Bhuyan 2000; Drope and Hansen 2006; Kolk 
and Levy 2001; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Martin 1995), respectively, potentially useful for 
policy makers in segmenting the market. 
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